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Beauty and Academic Career  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
  
 
We examine the impact of beauty on the academic career success of tenure-track accounting 
professors at top business schools in America, and show that beauty plays a significant role. 
Specifically, after controlling for gender, ethnicity, publication history, work experience, and 
quality of alma mater, more attractive professors obtain better first school placements post-
PhD and are granted tenure in a shorter period of time. These findings are broadly consistent 
with behavioural theory which predicts that facial attractiveness irrationally affects the 
perception of performance characteristics.  Interestingly, there is no incremental benefit of 
attractiveness for the career progression from associate to full professor. This finding is 
consistent with the notion that the role played by beauty in promotion diminishes when the 
individual’s ability and competency become apparent over time. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Beauty, accounting, career, labor market. 
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Beauty and Academic Career 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The value of beauty and its capacity for generating positive evaluations and impressions has 
long been the subject of discussion. A rapidly increasing body of literature in economics and 
sociology documents that beauty generates positive evaluations and impressions. In comparison 
with the less attractive, individuals with good looks are better liked (Walster, Aronson, Abrahams 
and Rottman, 1966; Kleck and Rubinstein, 1975; Feingold, 1990) and receive more favourable 
treatment in hiring, performance rating and promotion decisions (Landy and Sigall, 1974; Dipboye, 
Arvey and Terpstra, 1977; Landy and Sigall, 1974). Studies in the fields of economics and 
management have explored the effect of beauty on business success and document an association 
with favorable traits of firms’ top management (e.g., CEOs), such as confidence (Mobius and 
Roensblat, 2006) and happiness (Hamermesh and Abrevaya, 2013), which in turn contribute to 
higher shareholder values1. This widespread preference for physical attractiveness is commonly 
known as the “beauty premium” (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994), and its potency is such that that 
even those who associate with beautiful persons gain in perceived stature (Sigall and Landy, 1973).   
 As previous studies have shown, the beauty premium exists in many social contexts and across 
a wide variety of professions, leading us to question whether it is caused by discriminatory or 
perceived valuable skills.  On the one hand, physical attractiveness affects people’s perceptions of 
intellectual competence and general mental health (Eagly et al., 1991; Feingold, 1992; Langlois et 
                                                             
1 For example, Halford and Hsu (2014) document that firms enjoy higher returns around their announcement of hiring 
more attractive CEOs and higher acquirer returns upon acquisition announcements. 
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al., 2000; and Hosoda et al., 2003). Beautiful individuals are considered more socially competent 
(Miller, 1970; Dion, Berscheid and Walster, 1972; Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani and Longo, 1991). 
On the other hand, the literature also shows the link between beauty and positive life outcomes to 
be largely discriminatory and driven by the favorable treatment from others (Dion, Berscheid and 
Walster, 1972; Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; Mobius and Rosenblat, 2006). Given the mixed 
evidence, what drives the beauty premium remains a controversial issue.  
It is this debate that motivates us to re-examine the question in a new, previously unstudied, 
setting.  In this paper, we explore whether and how the beauty premium exists in academic career 
progression. Specifically, we examine whether beauty is associated with the quality of the first 
placement, the time to tenure, and the time from associate to full professor. There are several 
reasons to care about answers to this question. First, the vast majority of existing labor market-
based beauty research is cross-sectional, focusing on the impact of beauty at a specific point in 
time.  Little is known about the impact of beauty over the course of a person’s career.2 In this study, 
we extend the prior literature by assessing the impact of beauty on a professor’s career progression. 
Second, compared to industry jobs, performance evaluation criteria on research and teaching in 
academia are relatively clear and objective, making the hiring and promotion decisions less 
vulnerable to behavioral biases. If a “beauty premium” persists, this suggests that either academia 
is not as “fair” as we expect or the “perceived valuable skills” explanation dominates. Third, from 
the perspective of PhD students and junior faculty members, while it is difficult to change their 
                                                             
2 One notable exception is that of Sala et al. (2013), who use the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study data  to assess the 
impact of facial attractiveness on people’s socio-economic standing over one’s life.  The authors find that attractiveness 
matters for both genders and that its impact on occupational prestige is as important at the beginning of one’s career 
as it is at the end of one’s career, with no cumulative effects over one’s working career.   
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looks, understanding whether the bias exists and where it comes from can help them act to mitigate 
or avoid such biases.   
  We select accounting professors in US research institutions for this study, for several reasons. 
First, all PhD accounting programs in the US have a very clear mission of placing students to 
academic institutions. For this reason, each school only admits a few PhD students per year (i.e., 
usually between 2 to 4) and upon graduation, almost all accounting PhDs are placed at post-
secondary educational institutions.3  This placement strategy differs markedly from PhD programs 
in science, engineering, and economics, where most graduates find jobs in industry, and mitigates 
the self-selection concern that the physical appearance of industry orientated PhD graduates differs 
systematically from those who remain in academia. Second, accounting is a well-structured 
discipline in business schools. Since teaching performance and research productivity are relatively 
easy to measure, the quality and quantity of research can be controlled more effectively. Finally, 
the relevant study and work experience of this paper’s authors allows us a better understanding of 
the nuances involved in the hiring and promotion process. 
We expect a positive association between beauty and indicators of academic success. An 
academic career is a long journey. The quality of the first placement, the smooth process to tenure, 
and the time it takes to be promoted to full professor all suggest success at different stages of one’s 
career.  However, a candidate’s intellectual and social competencies are not readily apparent within 
a short time period. At the time of graduation, most newly minted PhDs do not yet have a top tier 
                                                             
3 While our main sample only consists of those individuals who are in tenure track positions as of 2015, in supplemental 
analysis we extend our sample to include all individuals who graduate with a PhD from a top 50 US business school 
during the years 1974 to 2016. It consists of 1,376 additional PhD graduates placed at schools of varying quality.  Very 
few individuals leave academia. Only 1.3% of these graduates go straight to industry or to lecturer positions after 
completing their PhD studies. We collect the information from annual Hasselback Accounting Faculty Directories. 
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publication and much of their work has been under supervision of, or co-authored with, others. As 
such, typical signals, such as the supervisor’s recommendation letter and the list of 
publications/working papers, could be very noisy proxies of one’s research ability and may drive 
hiring committees, consciously or unconsciously, to factor in attractiveness as a proxy for ability, 
resulting in more attractive candidates being placed at higher quality schools.  
We download the photos and CVs of accounting faculty members from university websites for 
the Businessweek Top 50 2015 MBA School rankings, and the top 50 2015 Brigham Young 
University’s (BYU) Research Publication rankings. We then supplement this list with accounting 
faculty from 31 lower tier US business schools, bringing our complete sample to 93 US business 
schools 4  yielding a total of 714 photo/CV combinations, from which we extract information 
concerning the variables we need to control for. These variables include education background, 
employment history, and information about publications and teaching.  For each photo, we take 
advantage of M-Turk, an Internet sourced study participant pool run by Amazon.com, to rate photo 
attractiveness.  Each photo is rated, on average, by 25 MTurk workers.     
We first examine the association between beauty and the school ranking of a PhD candidate’s 
first job placement. The school’s ranking is based on i) Businessweek Top 50 MBA School rankings 
for 2015; or ii) Brigham Young University’s (BYU) Research Publication rankings for  2015. After 
controlling for a number of personal characteristics and academic pedigree, we find a strong 
positive impact of perceived attractiveness on the school ranking of a PhD candidate’s first job 
                                                             
4  These lower tier institutions include the schools that some faculty have ultimately moved to such as Auburn 
University, Case Western Reserve University, Miami University, Saint Louis University, and University of Tennessee.  
There are a number of Businessweek and BYU universities for which photos and CVs could not be obtained.  These 
exceptions include South Carolina and Thunderbird for Businessweek rankings, and Temple, Florida International, 
Pittsburgh, Rutgers, Arkansas, and South Carolina for BYU rankings.   
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placement. In other words, more attractive PhD candidates are placed to more highly ranked 
schools.  Mediation analysis reveals that approximately 39% of the relationship between beauty 
and first placement quality is mediated by the number of flyouts a PhD candidate receives while 
on the job market. These findings show that while part of the relationship between beauty and labor 
market outcomes may be justified, the majority of the benefits accruing to beautiful individuals are 
discriminatory in nature.  
Next, we examine the association between beauty and time to tenure. Because tenure is not 
always achieved in one’s first placement school, individuals are forced to move if they fail to meet 
the tenure requirement of their current schools after the tenure clock runs out. Meanwhile, it is 
likely that some individuals voluntarily move to other schools if competing schools are exploiting 
the uncertainty of the tenure process and lure away good researchers. Therefore, when examining 
the association between beauty and time to tenure, we consider three scenarios: i) when tenure is 
achieved at a professor’s first school placement; ii) when tenure is achieved at a professor’s second 
school placement when there is a voluntary early departure from the first school; and iii) when 
tenure is achieved at a professor’s second or subsequent school placement and leaving the first 
school is a forced decision. We find that for scenarios i) and ii), there is a negative association 
between beauty and time to tenure. In other words, it takes less time for more attractive professors 
to achieve tenure.  However, for scenario iii), we find that the time to tenure is not affected by their 
perceived attractiveness. We further conduct mediation analysis and find that the number of unique 
coauthors on all published papers, the number of workshop presentations and the number of 
citations partially mediate the relationship between beauty and time to tenure. The majority of the 
benefits still accrue to the direct beauty-time to tenure relationship. 
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Further, we examine the association between beauty and the time to full professorship. Similar 
to the results for those professors who obtain tenure at their second or subsequent school, we find 
that the time to full professorship is not affected by beauty. These findings are consistent with the 
notion that sufficient time has passed for these individuals to demonstrate their ability.  Physical 
attractiveness is no longer a behavioral bias.    
Our study contributes to economics and psychology literature in several ways.  First, through 
studying the direct impact of attractiveness on career success in academia, we address the question 
whether the beauty premium is due to behavioral bias or perceived valuable skills.  No published 
study to date has explored the impact of physical attractiveness on initial job placement and career 
progression in tenure-track research positions.5  We are the first to show that when job candidates 
are seeking their first position as an assistant professor, hiring committees and tenure and 
promotion committees rely on attractiveness as a proxy for expected future potential.  We are also 
among the first researchers to explore the differential impact of beauty over the course of a person’s 
career.  Early in the academic’s career, the beauty premium is “alive and well”. However, as their 
career progresses, the beauty premium disappears and is not a determinant of the promotion from 
associate to full rank professor.  Remarkably, the market does not seem to correct for the pattern 
over time, as the same pattern observed for those professors obtaining tenure and full professorship 
                                                             
5 Sullivan and Dubnicki (2012) explore the determinants of the quality of first placement based on 849 economics PhD 
graduates in 2011. The working paper appears to be related to our study, but there are significant differences between 
the two.  Only 50.5% of the PhD graduates in Sullivan and Dubnicki’s sample are placed in economics departments. 
For non-academic placements, rankings are assigned arbitrarily. For example, placement to a business school equals 
the placement university's economics department ranking plus five;  non-tenure track job or postdoctoral position 
equals the placement university’s economics department ranking plus 15;  World Bank, International Monetary Fund, 
and Federal Reserve Board (6.4% placements) are equivalent to the 40th best economics department. The sample also 
consists of 31.9% non-US placements. With all this noise, they find some evidence that attractive, white, female 
candidates place at better institutions. 
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in the 1980s and 1990s continues to be seen for those professors being promoted more recently in 
the 2000s.  
Second, we take advantage of this unique setting to investigate the differential impact of 
perceived competency and perceived trustworthiness, in addition to perceived beauty, on career 
success.  Recent papers have found that perceived competency or trustworthiness predict some 
career outcomes better than perceived beauty.  For example, Dilger et al. (2015) find that research 
performance is not influenced by attractiveness but especially by perceived trustworthiness.  As 
another example, Graham et al. (2017) find that competent looks, but not attractiveness or 
trustworthiness, are reflected in CEO compensation. CEOs have a long history to reveal their talent 
before their hiring, which is different from our setting. We find that attractiveness subsumes the 
impact of perceived competency and trustworthiness in all career outcomes6.  Our findings are 
consistent with the notion that the “halo effect” relates to attractiveness, not to competency or 
trustworthiness.   
Third, we take advantage of the progress in technology to improve our methodology. Only a 
handful of large-scale surveys have collected independent evaluations of physical attractiveness 
(Sala et al., 2013).  Most rely on a single rating of a respondent’s attractiveness either by the 
interviewer, the respondent, or a teacher. We add a new level of rigor to the literature, gaining more 
objective ratings of respondents’ attractiveness by using photographs and having them rated, on 
average, by 25 unrelated individuals.  This treatment is expected to reduce measurement noise 
significantly. 
                                                             
6 The relationship between beauty and perceived competency/trustworthiness is relatively strong, with correlations 
between 0.4 and 0.5 for all samples. 
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Fourth, our findings have important practical implications. While only a very small percentage 
of the population become tenure-track professors at America’s business schools, a large percentage 
of the population is educated by these individuals.  As such, prospective students would do well to 
know the differential impact of attractiveness in the selection and promotion of professors as 
attractive professors may not necessarily be better researchers and educators.  Senior faculty should 
keep this in mind the next time they hire a rookie PhD or decide whether or not to grant tenure to 
an assistant professor.  Aspiring PhD candidates should note that while they may have little ability 
to change their attractiveness, it may have a significant influence on their career progression.  While 
the benefits of beauty disappear in the latter stages of one’s career, this may be “too little, too late” 
for less attractive professors as the benefit of obtaining an initial job placement at a top ranked 
school has long lasting effects. 
   The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature 
and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes data and research design. Section 4 presents the 
results of the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Background and Related Literature 
Broadly speaking, there are two general perspectives on the observed relationship between 
attractiveness and success.  These perspectives are: i) neoclassical - attractive individuals are 
“better” than their less attractive peers (i.e. smarter, socially competent); and ii) behavioral - 
attractive individuals are no “better” than others and succeed due to discrimination on the part of 
society (Graham et al., 2017).   
As an example of support for the first perspective, the empirical findings of Kanazawa and 
Kovar (2004) led them to reason that beautiful people are more intelligent when the following four 
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conditions are present: 1) more intelligent men are more likely to attain higher status; 2) higher-
status men are more likely to mate with more beautiful women; 3) intelligence is heritable and 4) 
beauty is heritable. Large nationally representative samples from both the United Kingdom and the 
United States supply Kanazawa (2011) with additional evidence that attractiveness and general 
intelligence are positively associated.  Mocan and Tekin (2010) find that unattractive individuals 
have a higher proclivity for committing crime.  The authors suggest beauty may positively impact 
human capital formation since attractive individuals participate in more activities that build 
confidence and leadership skills.  These skills, in turn, can lead to increased success in the labor 
market.  Conversely, for unattractive individuals lack of human capital formation can lead to an 
increased likelihood of school suspension and a lower grade point average. Further support can be 
found in Feingold’s (1992) meta-analysis of the literature, where social skills, freedom from social 
anxiety, opposite-sex popularity, and sexual experience are correlated with independent ratings of 
physical attractiveness (e.g. Lerner and Lerner, 1977; Pilkonis, 1977). More recently, in an 
experimental labor market where employers determine the wages of workers performing a maze-
solving task, Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) find that 15% to 20% of the beauty premium is 
transmitted through higher self-confidence.   
In terms of the second perspective, Dion (1973) finds that preschoolers discriminate differences 
in facial attractiveness, showing a distinct preference for attractive over unattractive children as 
potential friends. In another study by Clifford and Walster (1973), randomly selected fifth grade 
teachers evaluate a child’s potential based only on the child’s report cards and his/her photograph. 
The results confirm the researchers’ expectation that physical attractiveness affects teachers’ 
judgements in rating children’s social potential and intelligence. Benson, Karabenick and Lerner 
(1976) make use of a novel research setting in which hundreds of graduate school applications are 
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left in public phone booths in a large metropolitan airport. The applications only differed in the 
photograph of the applicant attached to the application. As predicted, delivery of the application 
was facilitated more for attractive than unattractive persons.  
Turning to academia, a few studies have explored the beauty effect in the classroom.  Among 
them, Hamermesh and Parker (2005) find that moving from one standard deviation below to one 
standard deviation above the mean instructor attractiveness level is associated with a one standard 
deviation increase in the average class effectiveness rating.  Consistent with this finding, Rosen 
(2018) finds a positive relationship between instructor quality and attractiveness.   
Other studies find similar results in work settings. For example, Landry et al. (2006) investigate 
the influence of attractiveness in the context of several charitable fund-raising strategies, finding 
higher attractiveness of female solicitors is associated with both increased contributions and 
participation.  Most recently, Ruffle and Shtudiner (2015) investigate the role of physical 
attractiveness in the hiring process.  They send over 5000 CVs, in pairs, to approximately 2600 
advertised job openings.  For each pair, one CV is without a photo whereas the other one includes 
a picture of either an attractive or a plain-looking individual. Employer callbacks to attractive men 
are significantly higher than to plain-looking men and to men with no photos. Surprisingly, perhaps 
due to jealousy, attractive women did not enjoy the same beauty premium.  
Overall, the findings provide consistent evidence that many benefits afforded to attractive 
individuals are discriminatory in nature, supporting the second perspective primarily and the first 
perspective to a lesser degree. Our brains seem genetically predisposed to subconsciously form an 
attractiveness stereotype, associating beauty with positive attributes.  This phenomenon is 
commonly known as the “beautiful-is-good” halo effect of attractiveness (e.g. Miller, 1970; Dion, 
Berscheid and Walster, 1972; Langlois, 1986; Eagly et al. 1991; Feingold, 1992; Jackson et al, 
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1995).    While a number of theories provide slightly different explanations for this discrimination, 
they are all broadly consistent with systematic biases of the mind (Kahneman, 2011).  
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
Humans are fundamentally social beings (Baumeister and Leary, 1995).   We try to preserve 
the integrity of our social group and status when selecting new group members.  Consider the 
impact of our evolutionary past on the inner workings of the brain, where many social interactions 
were brief and provided limited information.  The same can be said of many social interactions we 
encounter in today’s modern world. Not surprisingly, then, we often rely on first impressions to 
select new group members (Todorov et al., 2005; Bar, Neta and Linz, 2006; Willis and Todorov, 
2006).7  
At the time of completing a PhD, most graduates do not yet have a top tier publication and their 
work may be heavily influenced by mentors and senior co-authors. Recommendation letters from 
the graduate’s thesis supervisory committee are typically favorably biased, making it difficult for 
prospective employers to assess a candidate’s true potential.   
  A significant component in the hiring process is the campus visit, where candidates present 
their thesis paper and meet individually with faculty members.  A large part of the interview 
experience is “visual”, much like that of a presidential candidate performing on television, and this 
                                                             
7 A famous example that highlights the rise in importance of appearance was the first presidential debate between 
Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy.  Following the presidential debates, radio polls favored Nixon while television 
polls predicted that Kennedy would win.  Ultimately, Kennedy won the presidency with many pundits attributing the 
win to Kennedy’s superior image on television; as Kennedy was not better than Nixon on the actual issues.  Druckman 
(2003), in a controlled experiment, confirmed these claims using the original historical files and his students as 
listeners/viewers.  While radio listeners were the only participants in his study to consider issue agreement when 
assessing leadership effectiveness, television viewers were the only participants to consider perceptions of integrity 
when evaluating these same candidates. 
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is where attractive individuals excel.  In their experimental setting using undergraduate students 
and local townspeople, Mulford et al. (1998) find that attractive individuals are advantaged in two 
ways; first, they have greater opportunity for social exchange; and second, these exchange 
opportunities are with others who have a higher propensity to cooperate once the interaction is 
consummated.  
 In a setting using elementary school children, Lerner at al. (1990) find that physical 
attractiveness had its maximum influence on teachers’ judgments about students’ academic 
competence at the beginning of the school year, when the teachers had less personal behavioral 
information about the students.  As such, it may be that teachers were most likely to rely on 
stereotype associations between physical attractiveness and competence at this time. 
 Consistent with additional findings in Cook and Mobbs (2016) in the context of the CEO 
selection, the PhD hiring committee will likely unconsciously factor attractiveness into their 
selection process.  This leads to our first hypothesis, in alternative form: 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals’ facial attractiveness is positively associated with the school quality of 
the first job placement post-PhD.  
Most schools allow assistant professors a period of five to seven years to obtain tenure.8    Given 
that publication in a top tier accounting journal can easily take three to four years, from initial draft 
to final submission and approval, the tenure clock is rather short.  Following the argument in the 
previous section, whether one’s “true” research/teaching ability can be revealed within such a short 
time period remains an empirical question. In addition, most schools do not have a “rigid” written 
                                                             
8 Considering a large portion of the final year is the formal review process i.e. putting together the tenure promotion 
package, obtaining reference letters from professors at different schools, and formal meetings by the faculty and tenure 
promotion committee, the real period of time is approximately four to six years. 
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rule regarding the number of “A” publications required for tenure. This allows tenure and 
promotion committees a certain flexibility in their final decision.  In light of the logic presented 
above, other qualitative considerations likely play a role in the tenure promotion decision.   In 
addition, as noted above, there is strong empirical evidence to support the assertion that the benefits 
of beauty are discriminatory in nature.  As such, the benefits of beauty may persist even in the 
presence of evidence to the contrary.     
  This leads to our second hypothesis, in alternative form: 
Hypothesis 2:  Individuals’ facial attractiveness is negatively associated with the time to tenure.   
We separately assess professors who are tenured at the second or subsequent schools. On 
the one hand, since these professors have been working for several years, competing schools may 
exploit the uncertainty of the tenure process and lure them away with promises of a quick tenure 
decision. For such a voluntary leave, facial attractiveness is expected to be negatively associated 
with the time to tenure. On the other hand, it is possible that these professors fail to receive tenure 
at the first schools and are forced to leave. Restarting a tenure clock gives schools more time to 
evaluate their talent. Under this scenario, facial attractiveness is not necessarily associated with the 
time to tenure.  
It is more difficult to hypothesize the direction of the relationship between facial 
attractiveness and time to full professorship.  On the one hand, findings by Fiske and Taylor (1991) 
support the notion that the beauty effect is stronger when a direct measure of competence is absent 
than when it is present.  Once a professor has already obtained tenure (i.e. on average, 10 years 
after first beginning PhD studies), much is known about the individual’s past productivity and 
his/her prospects of future productivity i.e. quality and quantity of working papers.  In light of such 
strong competency indicators, no reliance need be placed on beauty as an imperfect proxy.    
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 In addition, and as argued by Cook and Mobbs (2016) in their paper on executive 
appearance and CEO selection, facial attractiveness for CEO candidates may only be an important 
distinguishing characteristic when candidates have similar skills causing firms to seek additional 
selection criteria.  By the time a professor has tenure, the pool of peers is sufficiently diversified in 
terms of publication history, working papers in the pipeline, and research interests.   
 On the other hand, the behavioral bias theory asserts that the benefits of attractiveness are 
discriminatory in nature and as such, benefits may be realized even when a candidate’s true skill 
sets are observable.  Specific to the promotion to full professor, promotion may also be driven by 
performance in administrative or outreach roles where communication is critical.  A recent paper 
by Gheroghiu et al. (2017) supports the assertion that attractive people are better at communicating 
to the public.      
  As such, due to conflicting directional hypotheses, we form the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Individuals’ facial attractiveness is not associated with the time to full 
professorship since obtaining tenure. 
III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND VARIABLES 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
We obtain a list of schools featured in the Businessweek Top 50 MBA schools in the USA 
for the year 2015 and a list of those featured in the Top 50 Brigham Young University’s (BYU) 
Research Publication rankings in the USA for the same year.  These are provided in Appendix B.   
Due to data availability issues for a number of schools, our sample is restricted to 48 top rated 
Businessweek schools and 44 top rated BYU schools.  We supplement this list with accounting 
faculty from an additional 31 lower tier US schools, bringing our complete sample to 93 business 
schools. We download the CVs and photographs of all professors at each of these schools who 
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obtained a PhD in accounting and who are tenure-track or tenured faculty.  We obtain current and 
historical school information, alma mater, gender, time to tenure, time to full professor, and number 
of years of non-academic working experience from each professor’s CV. The publication history 
for each professor (as of June 2015) is pulled from three independent sources: (1) the professor’s 
CV; (2) BYU’s website: http://www.byuaccounting.net/rankings/univrank/rankings.php; and (3) 
manual collection of publication information for each of the top 6 accounting journals over the past 
40 years.  Any discrepancies are investigated and resolved.  We obtain ethnicity information using 
a combination of visual photo inspection and/or background search of the surname. Assuming most 
individuals earn their undergraduate degree at age 22, we estimate professor age using the year the 
professor graduated from undergraduate studies. Finally, facial attractiveness is assessed using the 
ratings obtained from both student raters and Amazon Mechanical Turk workers, as detailed below. 
Our final sample includes 714 professors working at 48 Businessweek Top 50 MBA schools, 44 
BYU Top 50 schools, and 31 lower tier US business schools.  To examine the likelihood of leaving 
for industry and the attractiveness bias for those placed in non-top 50 schools, we collect 
information for an additional 1,394 professors from the Hasselback accounting faculty directories. 
The data is used for tests reported in our additional analysis section.   
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Measures of Facial Attractiveness 
Raw attractiveness scores are obtained from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a 
crowdsourcing Internet marketplace that enables individuals and employers (known as Requesters) 
to coordinate the use of human intelligence to perform tasks.  Employers post jobs known as HITs 
(Human Intelligence Tasks) and workers (called Providers or more colloquially Turkers) can then 
select jobs and complete tasks for a monetary payment set by the Employer.  For each photo, the 
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MTurk workers rate the attractiveness on two dimensions: (1) quantitative – on a scale of 0 (very 
unattractive) to 100 (very attractive); and (2) qualitative – as (a) below average; (b) average; (c) 
attractive; or (d) very attractive.  To ensure accuracy, only Turk “masters” are used to rate the 
photographs. “Masters” are those individuals who have proven themselves in the marketplace as 
high quality workers. 
Each photo is rated, on average, 25 times by MTurk workers.  The use of a composite rating 
is consistent with the work of Hamermesh and Parker (2005) and Sicinski (2009), who noted that 
the estimated coefficients on Beauty are smaller when based on evaluations of a single rater rather 
than a composite measure.  Composite measures are more reliable because they are based on 
aggregations of correlated responses.  The actual number of ratings varies slightly from photo to 
photo because a random number generator is used to select photos for each rater.  
 The raw quantitative scores for each professor photo are then converted into a single 
attractiveness measure.  First, the judge’s mean rating across all photographs that he or she coded 
is used to minimize bias from “nice” or “harsh” judges. 9  Specifically, we subtract the mean 
quantitative score given by a rater from each quantitative score received from the same rater. This 
adjustment is required in order to account for the fact that each rater may have different benchmarks 
for beauty, which would add noise to the measure.  Next, the average of the mean-adjusted scores 
is taken. Finally, the variable is normalized (between 0 and 100) to facilitate the interpretation of 
                                                             
9 To control for rating quality, we only include a rater’s scores in our sample if their ratings are of consistent quality.  
More specifically, we proxy for quality in two ways: (1) the standard deviation of quantitative scores for all 
photographs coded by an individual is at least 6 (quantitative scores range from 0 to 100); and (2) the correlation 
between qualitative and quantitative scores for a given rater is at least 0.60.  These cutoffs, though somewhat arbitrary, 
seem reasonable based on our review of the raw data.   
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regression coefficients. 10  We refer to this variable as the normalized quantitative facial 
attractiveness score (Quant Score).  Given that accounting professors attract little if any attention 
in social media, it is highly unlikely raters would know the identity of individuals they are rating 
and as such we are unconcerned that familiarity will bias the results.   
Since we are only able to collect the most recent professor photos from their institutions’ 
or personal websites, it is likely that the photos may not represent the individual’s looks at the time 
of their first job, tenure and full professorship respectively.  Previous research shows there to be 
minimal cross-cultural variation in people’s perceptions of which facial characteristics are 
considered attractive (e.g. Langlois et al. 2000; Perrett, May, and Yoshikawa 1994).  Nonetheless, 
to adjust for the potential correlation of facial attractiveness with age, gender and ethnicity, we first 
regress the above-mentioned Quant Score on an individual professor’s age, gender and ethnicity. 
The regression model is as follows: 
 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖  + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛_𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖  + 𝛽3𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖                      
(1) 
Definitions of all control variables are provided in Appendix A. Based on these coefficients we 
calculate the expected value of Quant Score for each individual professor in our sample. Our final 
measure of the quantitative facial attractiveness score, Beauty, is then calculated as the residual 
value of subtracting the expected Quant Score from the actual Quant Score. 
As noted above, all photographs are obtained from the respective school’s website and in 
all cases, the facial expression is either smiling or neutral (little variation), thus unlikely to affect 
                                                             
10 Some researchers standardize the individual scores by subtracting the mean and dividing by the coder’s standard 
deviation.  We do not adopt this method because it could potentially reward “irresponsible” judges that predominantly 
assign the average rating and penalize those that followed instructions and used the entire scale. 
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the empirical findings.  A study by Morrison et al. (2013) shows identity to be 2.2 times as 
important as emotion (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise) in rating attractiveness for 
male and female pictures, suggesting that attractiveness is stable.  Since the hard tissues of the face 
are unchangeable, raters are able to make attractiveness judgments based on structural cues11.  
3.2.2. Control Variables 
Since our empirical tests are designed to capture the relationship between attractiveness and 
career success, we control for characteristics likely to be correlated with (a) time to tenure and (b) 
quality of first school placement, in our multivariate tests.  Our control variables include gender, 
ethnicity, prior non-academic work experience, quality of prior institutions, and number/quality of 
publications. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix A.  
 
To test Hypothesis 1, we estimate the following model using OLS: 
1𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖  + 𝛽3𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽4𝑃ℎ𝐷_𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖
+  𝛽5𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑖
+ 𝛽6𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖+ 𝛽7𝑇𝑜𝑝6_𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑖
+  𝛽8𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑝6_𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑖+ 𝛽9𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑐_𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽10𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
(2) 
where the dependent variable is the school ranking measure 1stPlace_Ranking. Beauty is the 
measure of facial attractiveness of each professor’s picture as described in the previous section. 
To test Hypothesis 2, we estimate the following model using OLS: 
                                                             
11 We also calculate the qualitative attractiveness measure as the average qualitative rating received for each professor. 
More specifically, we code “below average” as 1, “average” as 2, “attractive” as 3, and “very attractive” as 4.  This 
alternative beauty measure deals with the concern that raters may provide different qualitative scores to professors.  
While we only report results using the residual value of normalized mean-adjusted quantitative scores in our main 
tests, all results are robust to the use of raw qualitative scores.   
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𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖+𝛽3𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑖
+ 𝛽4𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑖
+  𝛽5𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽6𝑃ℎ𝐷_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑇𝑜𝑝5𝑖
+  𝛽7𝑃ℎ𝐷_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑇𝑜𝑝20𝑖  + 𝛽8𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑇𝑜𝑝5𝑖 +  𝛽9𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑇𝑜𝑝20𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑇𝑜𝑝6_𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖
+  𝛽11𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑝6_𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖+ 𝛽12𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑐_𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖  + 𝛽13𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
                                    (3) 
where NumYrsTenure is the number of years between first placement after graduation and promotion 
to tenured professor. Beauty is the measure of facial attractiveness of each professor’s picture as described 
in the previous section. 
 
To test Hypothesis 3, we estimate the following model using OLS: 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑌𝑟𝑠𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖+𝛽3𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖
+  𝛽5𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽6𝑃ℎ𝐷_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑇𝑜𝑝5𝑖
+  𝛽7𝑃ℎ𝐷_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑇𝑜𝑝20𝑖  + 𝛽8𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑇𝑜𝑝5𝑖 +  𝛽9𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑇𝑜𝑝20𝑖
+  𝛽10𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑇𝑜𝑝5𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑇𝑜𝑝20𝑖  + 𝛽12𝑇𝑜𝑝6_𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖
+  𝛽13𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑝6_𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖+ 𝛽14𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑐_𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖+ 𝛽15𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 
            (4) 
 
where NumYrsFull is the number of years between Number of years between associate to full 
professor. Beauty is the measure of facial attractiveness of each professor’s picture as described in the 
previous section. 
IV. RESULTS 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the characteristics of the individuals in our sample. The number of 
observations in each regression varies with the availability of the variables included in the 
regression model. Our variable of interest, Beauty, has a mean value of 0 with a standard deviation 
of 14.709. It takes, on average, 6.46 years for an assistant professor to receive tenure and 6.35 years 
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for an associate professor to be promoted to full professor. To mitigate the concern that the number 
of years to tenure and full professor may be highly skewed and the coefficients estimated using 
OLS model specification will be biased, we plot the distribution of number of years to tenure and 
full professor in Figure 1. From this figure, we notice that the distribution of years to tenure and 
full professor resembles a normal distribution, suggesting that skewness is not a concern. As 
reported in Table 1, approximately 71.3% of our sample observations are male professors. The 
average age when data is collected is 48. In terms of ethnicity, 1.7% are African and 25.2% are 
Asian. The average work experience before they join academia is 2.11 years. In the year in which 
an assistant professor obtains tenure, the average number of publications in the Top 6 accounting 
journals is 3.36. This number increases to 5.82 in the year when associate professors are promoted 
to full professor. Correspondingly, the mean impact score of just tenured professors is 2.88. The 
same score is 3.02, on average, for professors who just received their full professorship.  
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for beauty measures. Panel A reports the summary 
statistics for the normalized mean-adjusted quantitative scores from MTurk raters. Panel B reports 
the summary statistics of the mean-adjusted quantitative scores by gender, ethnicity group and age. 
On average, female professors receive higher scores than male professors. Non-Asian/African 
professors and younger professors also tend to be rated higher.   
4.2. The Effect of Facial Attractiveness on Quality of First School Placement  
 
 Appendix C presents the OLS regression results of Equation (1). The results show that the 
coefficient on Gender is significantly negative with a value of -6.215 and a t-stat of -7.78, indicating 
that, on average, male professors receive lower facial attractiveness score ratings. Similarly, the 
coefficient on Ln_Age is also significantly negative with a value of -22.388, suggesting that raters 
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assign lower scores to older professors. We also include the ethnicity dummies in estimating 
Equation (1).  
Figure 3 plots the average first placement quality by attractiveness.  From this figure, we 
notice that more attractive PhD candidates are placed at higher quality schools. Table 3 reports the 
results of the test of H1. Columns (1) and (2) report the OLS regression results. In Column (1), the 
school rankings are based on the Businessweek Top 50 MBA School rankings from 2015. To 
mitigate the concern that our findings may be endemic to Businessweek rankings, we also conduct 
analysis based on Brigham Young University’s (BYU) Research Publication rankings for the same 
year.  These findings are reported in column (2).  The results show that the coefficient on Beauty 
is significantly negative in column (1) (with a value of -0.358 and a t-value of -3.03)12, indicating 
that more attractive candidates tend to place at better quality universities when they graduate from 
their PhD program. In terms of economic significance, the interquartile change of Beauty of 19.821 
[= 9.735- (-10.086)] is translated to a school ranking of 7.10 [= (-0.358) *19.821] places higher. 
Given the average ranking of the first school placement is 41.218, this is equivalent to an average 
of 17.22% [=7.10/41.218] higher increase in school ranking placement. This finding supports 
Hypothesis 1. The results are consistent under the OLS model specification and when BYU 
rankings are used, as shown in Columns (2). For other control variables, in Column (1), we note 
that the quality of first placement is influenced by the candidate’s work experience, as shown by 
the negative coefficient on WorkExpNumYear (with a value of -0.796 and a t-value of -1.67). On 
average, candidates with Asian ethnicity tends to be placed lower, evidenced by the positive 
                                                             
12 All standard errors are clustered at the school level.  
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coefficient on Ethnicity_Asian (with a value of 6.247 and a t-value of 2.24). The ranking of the first 
placement is also influenced by the quality of the candidate’s PhD program, as indicated by the 
significantly negative coefficient on PhD_Qual_Top5 (with a value of -30.947 and a t-value of -
11.99) and PhD_Qual_Top20 (with a value of -18.534 and a t-value of -6.44). In addition, the 
significantly negative coefficient on Top6_Asst (with a value of -7.000 and a t-value of -3.90) 
indicates that candidates who have publications in the top 6 accounting journals tend to have better 
placement when they graduate. The results for other control variables are similar in Column (2). 
4.3. The Effect of Facial Attractiveness on Requisite Time to Attain Tenure 
 
4.3.1 Professors who Attain Tenure at First School Placement 
Figure 4 plots the average number of years to obtain tenure by attractiveness, for those 
individuals who obtain tenure at their first school or at their second school where the move from 
the first school is voluntary.  From this figure we notice that more attractive assistant professors 
obtain tenure in a shorter period of time. Table 4, Panel A reports the results of the test of H2; 
specifically, the OLS regression results of the association between facial attractiveness (Beauty) 
and number of years to obtain tenure (NumYrsTenure) when tenure is achieved at a professor’s first 
school placement. The results show the coefficient on Beauty to be significantly negative (with a 
value of -0.028 and a t-stat of -2.99) in Column (1), indicating more attractive candidates obtain 
tenure at their first school placement in a shorter time period. In terms of economic significance, 
the interquartile change of Beauty of 19.821 [= 9.735- (-10.086)] is translated to a -0.55 [= (-0.028) 
*19.821] decrease in number of years to obtain tenure. Given the average number of years to tenure 
is 6.456, this is equivalent to an average of 8.5% [=0.55/6.456] shorter time in obtaining tenure. 
The significant negative coefficient (with a value of -0.628 and a t-stat of -3.80) on Gender 
indicates male professors tend to obtain tenure faster than female professors. In addition, the 
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significantly positive coefficient (with a value of 1.238 and a t-stat of 3.23) on Ethnicity_African 
indicates that candidates whose ethnicity group is African take longer to attain tenure. Professors 
from better quality universities tend to receive tenure faster, as indicated by the significantly 
negative coefficient (-0.909 with a t-stat of -2.61) on Asst_Qual_Top5. In addition, publications in 
both the top 6 accounting journals and non-top 6 accounting journals lengthen the time to tenure at 
one’s first school placement. We find pre-hiring work experience is no longer significant to explain 
the requisite time to tenure. The results based on BYU publication rankings, as reported in Column 
(2), are similar to those in Column (1).  
Some professors voluntarily leave their first placement universities, perhaps to move to a 
better academic environment or for personal reasons.  Table 4, Panel B reports the results of the 
test of H2 when tenure is achieved at a professor’s first school or at a professor’s second school 
placement when there is an early voluntary departure from the first school. The move is classified 
as an early voluntary departure if the number of years at the first school is less than or equal to 
three. Otherwise, it is treated as a forced departure. With the early voluntary departure cases 
included in the analysis, the sample size increases from 276 to 321. The results in Panel B are 
similar to that in Panel A. The coefficient on Beauty is significantly negative in all four model 
specifications, indicating a shorter time period for attractive candidates to obtain tenure.  
Overall, the results in Table 4 are consistent with our prediction in H2 that time to tenure is 
negatively associated with a professor’s facial attractiveness when tenure is achieved at a 
professor’s first school placement or second school placement in the event of voluntary early 
departure from the first school.   
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4.3.2 Professors who Attain Tenure at Second or Subsequent School Placement 
Table 5 reports the OLS regression results of H2 when tenure is achieved at a professor’s 
second or subsequent school placement and leaving the first school is a forced decision. Similar to 
above, we classify the move as a forced departure if the number of years before leaving the first 
school exceeds three. Consistent with our conjecture, the results show the coefficient on Beauty to 
be insignificant in all model specifications, indicating that time to tenure is not associated with 
professor’s facial attractiveness when tenure is achieved at a professor’s second or subsequent 
school placement.  
4.4 The Effect of Facial Attractiveness on Requisite Time to Become Full Professor  
Table 6 reports the results of the test of H3; specifically, the OLS regression results of the 
association between facial attractiveness measure (Beauty) and number of years to obtain full 
professorship from the time one first obtains tenure. Consistent with our prediction, the results 
show that the coefficient on Beauty to be insignificant in all model specifications, indicating time 
to obtain full professorship is not associated with the professor’s facial attractiveness.  
In summary, our findings suggest the behavior of hiring committees and tenure and 
promotion committees changes with the facial attractiveness of the candidate. At the time of 
graduation from PhD studies, many hiring committees “thin slice” on attractiveness as a proxy for 
quality, resulting in more attractive candidates being placed at higher quality schools.  This 
relationship continues to be observed in individuals obtaining tenure at their first school placement 
or their second school placement where the move from their first school is voluntary. For professors 
obtaining tenure at their second or subsequent school where the move is forced, and for those 
attaining full professorship, there is no observed impact of attractiveness.  
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4.5 Additional Analysis 
The results in Section 4.3 and 4.4 predominantly support the argument that facial 
attractiveness matters for the initial hiring and tenure decision when tenure is obtained at one’s 
early career stage. However, the mechanism by which attractive accounting academics gain an 
advantage remains unanswered. In this section, we conduct a series of additional analyses to further 
our understanding of the possible channels through which more attractive accounting professors 
receive favorable treatment on first placement and the tenure process.  
4.5.1 The Channels Through Which Facial Attractiveness Takes Effect 
Prior literature suggests that the major benefits of attractiveness come from selection. It is 
likely that the more attractive researchers are more confident and more socially adept. Thus, they 
are more likely to form important networks and establish coauthor relationships that can help their 
productivity. In addition, their proactive personality may help them obtain more flyout 
opportunities when they are on the job market and more workshop invitations after they become 
assistant professors. With a broader network and more exposure, it is also likely that their papers 
are cited more than their less attractive researchers. As such, in addition to the direct effect of 
Beauty on professors’ career outcomes, Beauty may take effect indirectly through other 
performance metric measures. In particular, we examine (1) whether Beauty affects other 
performance metric measures in academia; and (2) to what extent the relationship between Beauty 
and career outcomes is explained by the effect of Beauty on other performance metric measures.  
To test our conjectures, we hand collect a number of data points.  For PhD candidates, we 
calculate the number of flyout interviews when on the job market (Flyout_PhD).  For individuals 
who have attained the rank of associate or full professor, we calculate the number of unique 
coauthors on published papers (Coauthor_Asst), the number of workshop presentations 
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(Presentation_Asst), and the number of citations (Citation_Asst) during one’s time as assistant 
professor. Most of the data is obtained from professors’ self-disclosed curriculum vitae (CV). 
Based on the data collected, we conduct multi-variate analyses on the possible channels through 
which beauty can affect hiring and tenure outcomes. 
 Table 7 presents the results. We first estimate the mediation effect of different performance 
metric measures on the Beauty-career outcome relationship, using a path analysis depicted in 
Figure 2. Path a estimates the direct effect of Beauty on career outcomes (1stPlace_Ranking or 
NumYrsTenure). Path b is the direct effect of Beauty on performance metric measures 
(Flyout_PhD, Coauthor_Asst, Presentation_Asst, and Citation_Asst). The indirect effect of Beauty 
on career outcomes (1stPlace_Ranking or NumYrsTenure) is estimated through Path b × Path c. 
Table 7, Panel B reports that, on average, 8.50% of the estimated total effect of Beauty on 
1stPlace_Ranking is via Flyout_PhD. When tenure is achieved at a professor’s first school 
placement, 1.37%, 13.36% and 8.54% of the estimated total effect of Beauty on NumYrsTenure is 
via Coauthor_Asst, Presentation_Asst, and Citation_Asst respectively. The mediation effect is 
1.26%, 3.86% and 37.21% for Coauthor_Asst, Presentation_Asst, and Citation_Asst when tenure 
is achieved at a professor’s first school placement or second school placement when there is a 
voluntary early departure.  
 Overall, the results from the mediation analysis facilitate a better understanding of the 
relationship between facial attractiveness and career outcomes. The findings support our conjecture 
that other performance metric measures, such as Flyout_PhD, Coauthor_Asst, Presentation_Asst, 
and Citation_Asst, mediate the Beauty-career outcome relationship. The fact that the direct effect 
is larger than the indirect effect supports the notion that while there is empirical support for a both 
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a neoclassical and behavioural perspective of the benefits of beauty, the behavioural perspective 
dominates the neoclassical one.  
4.5.2 The Analysis on Other Facial Feature Measures  
In this section, we control for two additional facial feature measures: perceived competency 
(Competency) and perceived trustworthiness (Trustworthiness) and examine how they affect the 
career outcomes. These measures have been popularized by recent papers, such as Dilger et al. 
(2015), who find that research performance is influenced by perceived trustworthiness, and Graham 
et al. (2017), who find that competent looks are reflected in CEO compensation.  For this test, we 
ask M-Turk participants re-assess the photos and evaluate them based on perceived competency 
and trustworthiness. Both perceived competency and perceived trustworthiness are calculated 
using the same methodology as Beauty. The results are reported in Table 8. As shown in Columns 
(1), (4) and (7), the perceived competency (Competency) is negatively associated with the school 
ranking of the first placement, but not the number of years to obtain tenure. The perceived 
trustworthiness (Trustworthiness) is insignificant in Columns (2), (5) and (8), suggesting that 
perceived trustworthiness seems not to help in one’s academic career. After controlling for both 
the perceived competency (Competency) and the perceived trustworthiness (Trustworthiness), the 
facial attractiveness still matters to one’s academic career outcomes as evidenced by the significant 
coefficient on Beauty in Columns (3), (6) and (9). 
 Overall, the results in Table 8 provides some evidence supporting the argument in the prior 
literature that facial features such as the perceived competency (Competency) impact academic 
career outcomes. However, it does not subsume the effect of facial attractiveness. 
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4.5.3 The Impact of Rigorousness of the Tenure and Promotion Process 
 Because the tenure and promotion process varies across universities, it is likely that the 
impact of beauty on the ability to obtain tenure is more pronounced in those schools where 
discretion during the tenure and promotion process is high. We therefore divide our sample into 
two subsamples based on the rigorousness of the tenure process, and conduct analysis of the beauty 
effect on the tenure decision in each one.  
 Specifically, we look at two dimensions of rigorousness: (a) internal review rigorousness 
and (b) external review rigorousness. For internal review rigorousness, we hand collect information 
concerning the review process for tenure from each university in our sample. The degree of rigor 
is rated on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is the lowest degree of rigor and 5 is the highest. Low (high) 
rigor characterizes those schools where the candidate’s area department (independent professors 
and committees) does (do) the majority of the legwork to support promotion. For external review 
rigorousness, the degree of rigor is also rated on a scale from 1 to 5.  Low rigor characterizes those 
schools that enable the candidate to (i) select a large number of potential references, (ii) permit the 
candidate veto power or influence regarding references that should not be contacted, and (iii) 
permit the candidate’s chair or department to pick all of the references exclusively. High rigor 
characterizes those schools where the candidate has little influence on the above-mentioned 
promotion-related activities. Finally, we develop an aggregate promotion rigorousness score, 
where 1 is low rigor, 2 is moderate rigor and 3 is high rigor. Schools characterized by both high 
internal and external rigor are assigned a promotion rigorousness score of 3, while schools 
characterized by both low internal and external rigor are assigned a promotion rigorousness score 
of 1.  The remainder are assigned a score of 2.       
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We conduct regression analysis to examine the association between beauty and number of 
years to tenure for the subsamples. Table 9 reflects the results of the subsample analysis, with Panel 
A reporting the regression results of the association between beauty and number of years to obtain 
tenure when tenure is achieved at a professor’s first school placement. Panel B reports the 
regression results of the association between beauty and number of years to obtain tenure when 
tenure is achieved at a professor’s first school placement or second school placement when there 
is a voluntary early departure from the first school. Consistent with our predictions, the negative 
association between our beauty measure and number of years to obtain tenure is more pronounced 
in the less rigorous subsample across all model specifications, suggesting a correlation between 
greater judgmental discretion in the tenure and promotion process, and a high beauty premium. 
4.6 Robustness Checks 
4.6.1 Male vs. Female Analysis 
To examine whether the facial attractiveness effect on career outcomes differs between 
male and female professors, we conduct subsample analyses for the male and female subgroups. 
The results (untabulated) reveal that facial attractiveness matters for both male and female 
subgroups and the difference between the coefficients on Beauty for the two subgroups is not 
statistically significant. When interacting Beauty with Gender and including the interaction term 
in the regression models, the coefficient on the interaction term Beauty×Gender is insignificant for 
all our hypotheses. The results suggest that the effect of facial attractiveness on career outcomes 
does not differ between men and women. Our results are consistent with most studies in the 
literature, which find either weak or nonexistent gender differences (e.g. Eagly, Ashmore, 
Makhijani and Longo, 1991; Langlois et al., 2000). 
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4.6.2 Reclassification of the “Forced” Group 
In the main analysis, we treat professors who leave before the midterm review (or before 
the end of the third year) as “voluntary” leaving and place them into the first school sample, while 
professors who leave after the midterm review are classified as “forced” leaving. As a robustness 
check, we reclassify the “forced” group of professors into two sub-groups: (1) “high probability 
forced” – consisting of those professors who go to lower quality schools; and (2) “low probability 
forced” – consisting of those professors who go to higher quality schools. Based on the new 
classification, our new “voluntary leave” group consists of individuals who leave before the 
midterm review and those who leave after the midterm review but go to higher quality schools. We 
then re-run our analysis based on the new “voluntary” and “forced” group classification. The 
“voluntary” group size increases by 77. The untabulated results show that our regression results 
and inferences remain the same. 
4.6.3 PhD Graduates Not in Our Main Sample 
As noted in the sample selection, we supplement our sample of top rated Businessweek and 
BYU schools with accounting faculty from an additional 31 lower tier US schools.  Nonetheless, 
this sample may not be representative of the spectrum of high to lower quality schools.  In an effort 
to address this potentially significant selection problem, we track the career trajectory of all PhD 
graduates from the top 50 US Businessweek and BYU ranking schools, for the years 1974 to 2016, 
who are not already in our main sample.  We use the Hasselback Accounting Faculty Directories 
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to obtain this information. 13   We supplement these faculty directories with information from 
LinkedIn and Google searches where required.   
In total, we obtain information for an additional 2,842 PhD graduates from the top 50 US 
Businessweek and BYU ranking schools.  After losing 992 observations because of missing data 
points and 456 observations due to individuals who have retired, passed away, or are no longer 
active, we are left with 1,394 observations.   Consistent with expectations, the vast majority (95%) 
of PhD graduates (1323) remain in academia.  18 graduates do not enter tenure-track positions and 
go straight to industry or to lecturer positions.  53 graduates start in tenure-track positions but 
subsequently go into industry or into lecturer positions.  While those individuals who go straight 
to lecturer (industry) are statistically more (less) attractive than those who stay in academia, the 
sample sizes are very small (less than 1%) and as such, the difference should not have any material 
impact on our findings.  For those individuals who start in academia and later decide to go into 
industry/become a lecturer, there is no significant beauty difference between them and those who 
stay in academia.   
    Consistent with results in the main sample, individuals who are more beautiful are placed 
at a higher quality school.14  When beauty, competency and trustworthiness are included in the 
same regression, only beauty is significantly associated with first placement quality.  In addition, 
and again, consistent with results for our main sample, beauty is associated with a shorter time to 
                                                             
13 For this additional sample, collection of publication and work experience information would be prohibitively time 
consuming and costly.  As such, the conclusions from these additional regression analyses are subject to this data 
limitation. 
14 To reflect the fact that some individuals in this additional sample go to schools outside of the US, post-PhD, we use 
the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) and the Times Higher Education World University Rankings 
to assist with categorization.   
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tenure if tenure is achieved at professor’s first school placement or at a professor’s second school 
placement when there is a voluntary early departure from the first school.  In contrast, beauty is 
not associated with time to tenure if tenure is achieved at a professor’s second or subsequent school 
placement and leaving the first school is a forced decision.  Finally, beauty and gender are not 
associated with the time to full professorship. These results are also consistent with those from the 
main sample.   
In summary, our additional analyses resolve two main questions.  First, since the majority 
of PhD graduates stay in academia, we are not concerned about the selection concern of career 
movement out of academia being systematically associated with attractiveness.   Second, by 
tracking the remaining sample of PhD graduates over their career, we confirm all findings from 
our main sample and show that our results are not sensitive to the selection of those individuals 
who are currently at higher quality schools.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Using human rater scores to proxy for the attractiveness of tenure-track accounting 
professors and controlling for characteristics such as publication history, non-academic work 
experience, and quality of alma mater, we show that attractiveness has significant impact on a 
professor’s career success. Specifically, attractiveness is associated with better first school 
placements post-PhD and the attainment of a quicker route to tenure.  This observed beauty 
premium is muted for those schools where the tenure and promotion process is more rigorous.  
Interestingly, however, there is no association between attractiveness and time to tenure for those 
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professors who obtain tenure at their second school and for individuals when making the transition 
from the role of associate professor to that of full professor.   
Our findings are broadly consistent with “beauty premium” findings from other studies.  
Using mediation analyses, we show that in those instances where a beauty premium exists, the 
majority of the premium is discriminatory in nature.  While the extension of prior research findings 
to a different context may seem at first only an incremental contribution, we believe that we add 
much to the current literature.  
Most importantly, we show that academics are prone to the same bias, the so called beauty 
premium, as the rest of society. With a simple and clean setting, we demonstrate that such bias is 
mitigated and eventually disappears over the course of a person’s career.  Our study is the first to 
discover that the impact of attractiveness is contingent upon career phase/stage. While we cannot 
fully rule out other possibilities, such evidence is consistent with the conjecture that beauty is a 
noisy proxy for good talent and the beauty premium will disappear when information about 
people’s talent becomes fully revealed.  These insights contribute to our understanding of beauty 
and its role in our society.    
Future research could examine whether the benefits of attractiveness apply in a similar way 
to academic success in other countries, where the relationship may be impacted by different cultural 
and social norms. Another interesting extension would be to focus on teaching schools and 
teaching-track positions within research-centric institutions to see if the same beneficial impacts of 
attractiveness are observed in this context.  Future research could also investigate whether, and to 
what extent, we are learning from our known heuristic biases to avoid repeating prior mistakes.  
Given the plethora of previous research studies on attractiveness and the multitude of theories 
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developed to explain this phenomenon, it is safe to say there are more interesting research topics 
yet to be explored. 
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Appendix A 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
  
1stPlace_Ranking School ranking of the first placement as per 2015 Businessweek rating (or BYU 
all publication ranking) of US schools. 
  
NumYrsTenure 
 
Number of years between first placement after graduation and promotion to 
tenured professor.  
  
NumYrsFull Number of years between associate to full professor. 
  
Beauty 
 
 
 
 
 
The measure of facial attractiveness of each professor’s picture. It is calculated 
as the residual value of subtracting the expected Quant Score from the actual 
Quant Score. The expected Quant Score is calculated based on the coefficients 
obtained from 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖  + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛_𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑖 +
𝛽4𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                          
(1) 
where actual Quant Score is the normalized mean-adjusted quantitative facial 
attractiveness score of each picture calculated from MTurk workers’ ratings.  To 
calculate actual Quant Score, we start with the raw quantitative scores and make 
the following adjustments: 1) subtract the mean quantitative score given by a 
rater from each quantitative score received from the same rater; 2) calculate the 
average of the scores for each photo; and 3) normalize the scores between 0 and 
100 to facilitate the interpretation of regression coefficients. 
  
Gender An indicator variable equal to one if the professor is male; zero otherwise. 
  
Ln_Age Estimated professor age as of 2015 (natural logarithm). It is estimated using the 
year the professor graduated from undergraduate studies as a proxy for the year 
he/she turned 22. 
  
Ethnicity_African 
 
An indicator variable equal to one if the professor has African ethnicity; zero 
otherwise. 
  
Ethnicity_Asian 
 
An indicator variable equal to one if the professor has Asian ethnicity; zero 
otherwise. 
  
WorkExpNumYear The number of years of non-academic (industry) working experience.  
  
PhD_Qual_Top5 
 
 
An indicator variable equal to one if the school where professor obtained his/her 
PhD degree ranked as top 5, as per 2015 Businessweek rating (or BYU all 
publication ranking) of US schools; zero otherwise. 
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PhD_Qual_Top20 
 
 
An indicator variable equal to one if the school where professor obtained his/her 
PhD degree ranked between 6th to 20th, as per 2015 Businessweek rating (or 
BYU all publication ranking) of US schools; zero otherwise. 
  
PhD_Qual_Top20 
 
 
An indicator variable equal to one if the school where professor obtained his/her 
PhD degree ranked between 6th to 20th, as per 2015 Businessweek rating (or 
BYU all publication ranking) of US schools; zero otherwise. 
  
Asst_Qual_Top5 
 
 
An indicator variable equal to one if the school where professor is an assistant 
professor ranked as top 5, as per 2015 Businessweek rating (or BYU all 
publication ranking) of US schools; zero otherwise. 
 
Asst_Qual_Top20 
 
An indicator variable equal to one if the school where professor is an assistant 
professor ranked between 6th to 20th, as per 2015 Businessweek rating (or BYU 
all publication ranking) of US schools; zero otherwise. 
  
Assoc_Qual_Top5 
 
 
An indicator variable equal to one if the school where professor is an associate 
professor ranked as top 5 schools, as per 2015 Businessweek rating (or BYU all 
publication ranking) of US schools; zero otherwise. 
  
Assoc_Qual_Top20 
 
 
An indicator variable equal to one if the school where professor is an associate 
professor ranked between 6th to 20th, as per 2015 Businessweek rating (or BYU 
all publication ranking) of US schools; zero otherwise. 
  
Top6_Asst 
 
Number of publications in Top 6 accounting journals, denoted as JAR, JAE, 
CAR, TAR, AOS, RAST, as of the year when becoming assistant professor. 
  
NonTop6_Asst 
 
Number of publications in non-Top 6 accounting journals, where accounting 
journals must be on Thomson Reuters Journal Citations Reports database, as of 
the year when becoming assistant professor. 
  
NonAcc_Asst 
 
 
Number of publications in non-accounting journals (i.e., economics, finance and 
management journals), where the journals must be on Thomson Reuters Journal 
Citations Reports database, as of the year when becoming assistant professor. 
  
Top6_Assoc 
 
Number of publications in Top 6 accounting journals, denoted as JAR, JAE, 
CAR, TAR, AOS, RAST, as of the year when becoming associate professor. 
  
NonTop6_Assoc 
 
 
Number of publications in non-Top 6 accounting journals, where accounting 
journals must be on Thomson Reuters Journal Citations Reports database, as of 
the year when becoming associate professor. 
  
NonAcc_Assoc 
 
 
Number of publications in non-accounting journals (i.e., economics, finance and 
management journals), where the journals must be on Thomson Reuters Journal 
Citations Reports database, as of the year when becoming associate professor. 
  
Top6_Full 
 
Number of publications in Top 6 accounting journals, denoted as JAR, JAE, 
CAR, TAR, AOS, RAST, as of the year when becoming full professor. 
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NonTop6_Full 
 
Number of publications in non-Top 6 accounting journals, where accounting 
journals must be on Thomson Reuters Journal Citations Reports database, as of 
the year when becoming full professor. 
  
NonAcc_Full 
 
 
Number of publications in non-accounting journals (i.e., economics, finance and 
management journals), where the journals must be on Thomson Reuters Journal 
Citations Reports database, as of the year when becoming full professor. 
  
ImpactScore_Asst 
 
 
Mean impact factor of professor’s publications as of the year when becoming 
assistant professor; where publications must be on Thomson Reuters Journal 
Citations Reports database. 
  
ImpactScore_Assoc 
 
 
Mean impact factor of professor’s publications as of the year when becoming 
associate professor; where publications must be on Thomson Reuters Journal 
Citations Reports database. 
  
ImpactScore_Full 
 
 
Mean impact factor of professor’s publications as of the year when becoming 
full professor; where publications must be on Thomson Reuters Journal 
Citations Reports database. 
  
Flyout_PhD Number of flyout presentations, as of the time when finishing PhD. 
  
Coauthor_Asst Number of unique co-authors on all published papers as of the last year of the 
assistant professorship. 
  
Presentation_Asst Number of invited workshop presentations as of the last year of the assistant 
professorship. 
  
Citation_Asst Number of citations as of the last year of the assistant professorship. 
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Appendix B  
Top 50 School Rankings 
Ranking School Name Ranking School Name 
  Businessweek Rankings 
BYU All Publication Rankings 
(U.S. Schools in 2015)   Businessweek Rankings 
BYU All Publication Rankings 
(U.S. Schools in 2015) 
1 Chicago Stanford 26 Texas A&M Texas at Dallas 
2 Harvard Texas at Austin 27 Ohio State  Washington 
3 Pennsylvania Southern California 28 South Carolina UC, Berkeley 
4 Stanford Ohio State 29 Southern Methodist Missouri 
5 Northwestern Pennsylvania 30 Georgetown Notre Dame 
6 Duke  Arizona State 31 Washington at St. Louis Baruch College 
7 Cornell  Texas A&M 32 Brigham Young Arizona 
8 Michigan  UIUC 33 Wisconsin Pittsburgh 
9 MIT Indiana 34 Rice Harvard 
10 Virginia Michigan State 35 Minnesota Iowa 
11 Carnegie Mellon Chicago 36 Michigan State Bentley 
12 Dartmouth UNC-Chapel Hill 37 Washington Florida 
13 Columbia Georgia 38 Penn State Kentucky 
14 UC,  Berkeley  Duke 39 Boston University Rutgers 
15 Indiana  Brigham Young 40 Illinois Emory 
16 New York University  Temple 41 Purdue  Penn State 
17 North Carolina New York University 42 Babson Michigan 
18 UCLA Cornell 43 UC, Irvine Alabama 
19 Texas at Austin MIT 44 Wake Forest Arkansas 
20 Notre Dame Northeastern 45 Thunderbird UCLA 
21 Yale Northwestern 46 Texas Christian UC, Irvine 
22 Emory Florida International 47 Florida South Carolina 
23 Georgia Tech Boston College 48 Boston College Utah 
24 Maryland Columbia 49 Arizona State Rice 
25 Vanderbilt Wisconsin-Madison 50 Rochester Houston 
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Appendix C  
The Association between Beauty and Individual Characteristics 
 
This table reports the OLS regression results of Quant Score on individual characteristics. The full sample includes 
714 individuals with available data. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. T-values are in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
    Quant Score 
   
Intercept  139.199*** 
  (23.59) 
Gender  -6.215*** 
  (-7.78) 
Ln_Age  -22.388*** 
  (-14.59) 
Ethnicity_African  1.412 
  (0.51) 
Ethnicity_Asian  -3.567*** 
  (-4.31) 
   
No. of Obs  714 
Adj R-Sq   0.312 
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics on variables used in the main regression analyses. Variable definitions 
are provided in Appendix A. 
 
  N Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 
       
1stPlace_Ranking (Businessweek) 714 41.218 33.769 14.000 32.500 63.000 
1stPlace_Ranking (BYU) 714 54.374 67.389 11.000 35.000 77.000 
NumYrsTenure 500 6.456 2.253 5.000 6.000 7.000 
NumYrsFull 284 6.352 3.254 5.000 6.000 7.000 
Beauty 714 0.000 14.709 -10.086 -0.139 9.735 
Gender 714 0.713 0.453 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Age 714 48.189 11.621 38.000 47.000 58.000 
Ethnicity_African 714 0.017 0.129 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ethnicity_Asian 714 0.252 0.435 0.000 0.000 1.000 
WorkExpNumYear 714 2.111 2.886 0.000 1.000 3.000 
PhD_Qual_Top5(Businessweek) 714 0.162 0.369 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PhD_Qual_Top20 (Businessweek) 714 0.272 0.445 0.000 0.000 1.000 
PhD_Qual_Top5(BYU) 714 0.154 0.361 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PhD_Qual_Top20 (BYU) 714 0.262 0.435 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Asst_Qual_Top5 (Businessweek) 500 0.163 0.370 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Asst_Qual_Top20 (Businessweek) 500 0.229 0.421 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Asst_Qual_Top5 (BYU) 500 0.134 0.341 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Asst_Qual_Top20 (BYU) 500 0.220 0.414 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Assoc_Qual_Top5 (Businessweek) 284 0.126 0.332 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Assoc_Qual_Top20 (Businessweek) 284 0.231 0.422 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Assoc_Qual_Top5 (BYU) 284 0.136 0.344 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Assoc_Qual_Top20 (BYU) 284 0.276 0.448 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Top6_Asst 714 0.434 0.763 0.000 0.000 1.000 
NonTop6_Asst 714 0.056 0.242 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NonAcc_Asst 714 0.115 0.441 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Top6_Assoc 500 3.360 2.618 1.000 3.000 5.000 
NonTop6_Assoc 500 0.458 0.987 0.000 0.000 1.000 
NonAcc_Assoc 500 1.172 2.116 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Top6_Full 284 5.817 3.987 3.000 6.000 9.000 
NonTop6_Full 284 1.018 1.792 0.000 0.000 1.000 
NonAcc_Full 284 2.606 3.467 0.000 1.000 4.000 
ImpactScore_Asst 714 0.977 1.418 0.000 0.000 2.192 
ImpactScore_Assoc 500 2.884 1.151 2.487 3.116 3.436 
ImpactScore_Full 284 3.018 0.860 2.568 3.083 3.497 
Flyout_PhD 419 5.697 4.978 0.000 6.000 9.000 
Coauthor_Asst 477 6.704 4.7117 4.000 6.000 9.000 
Presentation_Asst 277 14.819 12.496 4.000 12.000 23.000 
Citation_Asst 141 38.206 60.490 2.000 19.000 45.000 
Competency 714 59.395 14.623 50.557 60.589 69.826 
Trustworthiness 714 65.341 14.716 56.373 65.023 75.716 
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Table 2  
Summary Statistics for Beauty measures 
This table reports the summary statistics for beauty measures. Panel A reports the summary statistics for 
normalized mean-adjusted quantitative scores. Panel B reports the summary statistics of the mean-adjusted 
quantitative scores by gender, ethnicity group and age. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A 
  N Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 
Quant Score 714 40.398 18.612 25.996 37.620 53.376 
       
 
Panel B 
  Quant Score 
By gender:    
 Male professors  44.96  
 Female professors  53.12  
 Difference: male-female  -8.16***  
By ethnicity:    
 Asian/African professors  46.59  
 Non-Asian/African professors  47.56  
 Difference: A/F-non A/F  -0.97**  
By age:    
 Below 40  54.17  
 Above 40  44.24  
  Difference: Below 40 - Above 40   9.92***   
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Table 3  
The Relation between Beauty and Quality of First Placement as Assistant Professor 
 
This table reports the OLS regression results of 1stPlace_Ranking on Beauty. The full sample includes 714 
individuals with available data. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at 
the school level. T-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
  1stPlace_Ranking 1stPlace_Ranking 
  (Businessweek school)  (BYU publications) 
  OLS OLS 
    
    
Intercept  57.639*** 70.940*** 
  (19.62) (9.46) 
Beauty  -0.358*** -0.496** 
  (-3.03) (-2.55) 
Gender  -3.385 -0.531 
  (-1.22) (-0.10) 
Ethnicity_African  4.834 -0.649 
  (0.73) (-0.07) 
Ethnicity_Asian  6.247** 8.687 
  (2.24) (1.53) 
WorkExpNumYear  -0.796* -1.056 
  (-1.67) (-1.18) 
PhD_Qual_Top5  -30.947*** -28.000*** 
  (-11.99) (-4.70) 
PhD_Qual_Top20  -18.534*** -20.782*** 
  (-6.44) (-3.18) 
Top6_Asst  -7.000*** -11.363*** 
  (-3.90) (-5.12) 
NonTop6_Asst  3.523 18.250 
  (0.61) (1.17) 
NonAcc_Asst  -1.845 9.492 
  (-0.56) (1.34) 
ImpactScore_Asst  -1.033 -3.723** 
  (-1.08) (-1.97) 
    
    
No. of Obs  714 714 
Adj R-Sq  0.1920 0.0632 
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Table 4  
The Relation between Beauty and Number of Years to Obtain Tenure when Tenure is Achieved at a 
Professor’s First School Placement or Second School Placement when there is a Voluntary Early 
Departure from the First School 
This table reports the OLS regression results of NumYrsTenure on beauty measures. Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. T-values are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A Tenure is Achieved at a Professor’s First School Placement 
 (1) (2) 
 NumYrsTenure NumYrsTenure 
 (Businessweek school)  (BYU publications) 
 OLS OLS 
   
Intercept 5.532*** 5.470*** 
 (22.61) (19.93) 
Beauty -0.028*** -0.021*** 
 (-2.99) (-2.59) 
Gender -0.628*** -0.612*** 
 (-3.80) (-4.09) 
Ethnicity_African 1.238*** 1.478*** 
 (3.23) (4.24) 
Ethnicity_Asian -0.032 0.035 
 (-0.18) (0.20) 
WorkExpNumYear 0.003 -0.017 
 (0.10) (-0.46) 
PhD_Qual_Top5 -0.687*** -0.194 
 (-2.96) (-0.86) 
PhD_Qual_Top20 -0.102 0.113 
 (-0.49) (0.56) 
Asst_Qual_Top5 -0.909*** -0.209 
 (-2.61) (-0.82) 
Asst_Qual_Top20 -0.300* -0.186 
 (-1.66) (-0.55) 
Top6_Assoc 0.113*** 0.086** 
 (3.33) (2.51) 
NonTop6_Assoc 0.270*** 0.306*** 
 (3.95) (4.02) 
NonAcc_Assoc 0.118** 0.079* 
 (2.52) (1.91) 
ImpactScore_Assoc 0.094 0.068 
 (1.21) (0.89) 
   
No. of Obs 276 276 
Adj R-Sq 0.2061 0.1129 
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Panel B Tenure is Achieved at a Professor’s First School Placement or Second School Placement when 
There is a Voluntary Early Departure From The First School  
 (1) (2) 
 NumYrsTenure NumYrsTenure 
 (Businessweek school)  (BYU publications) 
 OLS OLS 
   
Intercept 5.555*** 5.551*** 
 (24.52) (22.04) 
Beauty -0.024** -0.019** 
 (-2.43) (-2.32) 
Gender -0.733*** -0.697*** 
 (-4.44) (-4.43) 
Ethnicity_African 1.186*** 1.401*** 
 (3.05) (3.61) 
Ethnicity_Asian 0.026 0.089 
 (0.13) (0.47) 
WorkExpNumYear 0.005 -0.017 
 (0.15) (-0.47) 
PhD_Qual_Top5 -0.497** -0.123 
 (-2.24) (-0.57) 
PhD_Qual_Top20 0.124 0.032 
 (0.67) (0.17) 
Asst_Qual_Top5 -1.094*** -0.194 
 (-3.27) (-0.63) 
Asst_Qual_Top20 -0.347 -0.242 
 (-1.50) (-0.76) 
Top6_Assoc 0.109*** 0.083** 
 (3.46) (2.47) 
NonTop6_Assoc 0.288*** 0.330*** 
 (4.40) (4.58) 
NonAcc_Assoc 0.152*** 0.110*** 
 (3.86) (3.01) 
ImpactScore_Assoc 0.105 0.085 
 (1.49) (1.20) 
   
No. of Obs 321 321 
Adj R-Sq 0.2008 0.1157 
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Table 5  
The Relation between Beauty and Number of Years to Obtain Tenure when Tenure is Achieved at a 
Professor’s Second or Subsequent School Placement and Leaving the First School is a Forced Decision 
 
This table reports the OLS regression results of NumYrsTenure on beauty measures. Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. T-values are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 NumYrsTenure NumYrsTenure 
 (Businessweek school)  (BYU publications) 
 OLS OLS 
   
Intercept 7.467*** 7.519*** 
 (10.52) (10.63) 
Beauty -0.016 -0.010 
 (-0.81) (-0.50) 
Gender -0.216 -0.299 
 (-0.57) (-0.79) 
Ethnicity_African -0.079 -0.238 
 (-0.09) (-0.27) 
Ethnicity_Asian 1.149*** 1.122** 
 (2.62) (2.46) 
WorkExpNumYear 0.108 0.126 
 (1.25) (1.30) 
PhD_Qual_Top5 -0.137 0.570 
 (-0.22) (1.04) 
PhD_Qual_Top20 0.070 0.592 
 (0.16) (1.28) 
Asst_Qual_Top5 -1.390*** -1.158** 
 (-2.63) (-2.36) 
Asst_Qual_Top20 0.088 -1.135 
 (0.17) (-1.60) 
Top6_Assoc 0.129 0.110 
 (1.34) (1.25) 
NonTop6_Assoc 0.237 0.287 
 (0.74) (0.86) 
NonAcc_Assoc 0.129 0.134 
 (1.24) (1.31) 
ImpactScore_Assoc -0.134 -0.163 
 (-0.71) (-0.85) 
   
No. of Obs 179 179 
Adj R-Sq 0.0363 0.0366 
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Table 6  
The Relation between Beauty and Number of Years to Obtain Full Professorship 
This table reports the OLS regression results of NumYrsFull on beauty measures. The full sample includes 284 
individuals with available data. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at 
the school level. T-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 NumYrsFull NumYrsFull 
 (Businessweek school)  (BYU publications) 
 OLS OLS 
   
Intercept 9.186*** 9.496*** 
 (9.97) (9.03) 
Beauty 0.025 0.021 
 (1.27) (1.04) 
Gender -0.565 -0.623 
 (-0.98) (-1.15) 
Ethnicity_African 0.390 0.450 
 (0.61) (0.70) 
Ethnicity_Asian 0.182 0.198 
 (0.44) (0.42) 
WorkExpNumYear 0.036 0.042 
 (0.61) (0.64) 
PhD_Qual_Top5 0.114 -0.149 
 (0.23) (-0.33) 
PhD_Qual_Top20 -0.190 -0.540 
 (-0.45) (-1.19) 
Asst_Qual_Top5 -1.407* -0.924 
 (-1.69) (-1.40) 
Asst_Qual_Top20 -0.430 -0.538 
 (-0.83) (-1.01) 
Assoc_Qual_Top5 0.504 0.066 
 (0.79) (0.11) 
Assoc_Qual_Top20 0.012 -0.233 
 (0.02) (-0.42) 
Top6_Full -0.022 -0.031 
 (-0.42) (-0.71) 
NonTop6_Full 0.140 0.198 
 (0.98) (1.58) 
NonAcc_Full -0.080 -0.090 
 (-1.40) (-1.44) 
ImpactScore_Full -0.658*** -0.688*** 
 (-2.78) (-2.92) 
   
No. of Obs 284 284 
Adj R-Sq 0.0408 0.0437 
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Table 7 
Beauty Effects through Various Channels 
This table reports evidence that Beauty affects school quality of first placement (1stPlace_Ranking) and time to tenure (NumYrsTenure) through various “Channel” variables 
(Flyout_PhD, Coauthor_Asst, Presentation_Asst, and Citation_Asst). Panel A reports the mediation effect of the channel variable Flyout_PhD on the relationship between 
Beauty and the school quality of first placement (1stPlace_Ranking). Flyout_PhD is the number of flyout presentations as at the time of finishing PhD degree. Panel B reports 
the mediation effect of the channel variables (Coauthor_Asst, Presentation_Asst, and Citation_Asst) on the relationship between Beauty and time to tenure (NumYrsTenure). 
Coauthor_Asst is the number of unique co-authors on all published papers as of the last year of the assistant professorship. Presentation_Asst is the number of invited workshop 
presentations as of the last year of the assistant professorship. Citation_Asst is the number of citations as of the last year of the assistant professorship. Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A Mediation effect of fly out (Flyout_PhD) on the relationship between Beauty and the school quality of first placement (1stPlace_Ranking). 
Dependent  Mediator Indirect effect Direct effect of Total effect Proportion of Ratio of indirect 
variable  of Beauty mediated Beauty (direct+indirect) of  total effect to direct 
    by the mediator    Beauty mediated   
1stPlace_Ranking Flyout_PhD -0.0318 -0.3429 -0.3748 0.0850 0.0929 
 
 
Panel B Mediation effect of coauthorship (Coauthor_Asst), invited workshop presentation (Presentation_Asst), and citation (Citation_Asst) on the relationship 
between Beauty and time to tenure (NumYrsTenure). 
Dependent  Mediator Indirect effect 
Direct 
effect of Total effect 
Proportion 
of 
Ratio of 
indirect 
variable  of Beauty mediated Beauty 
(direct+indirect) 
of  total effect to direct 
    by the mediator    Beauty mediated   
When tenure is achieved at a professor’s first school placement     
NumYrsTenure Coauthor_Asst -0.0005 -0.0344 -0.0349 0.0137 0.0138 
NumYrsTenure Presentation_Asst -0.0066 -0.0427 -0.0493 0.1336 0.1543 
NumYrsTenure Citation_Asst -0.0051 -0.0545 -0.0596 0.0854 0.0934 
       
When tenure is achieved at a professor’s first school placement or second school placement when there is a 
voluntary early departure     
NumYrsTenure Coauthor_Asst -0.0004 -0.0333 -0.0338 0.0126 0.0127 
NumYrsTenure Presentation_Asst -0.0012 -0.0299 -0.0311 0.0386 0.0402 
NumYrsTenure Citation_Asst -0.0115 -0.0195 -0.0310 0.3721 0.5926 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3092844 
 52 
 
 
Table 8 
Additional Control for Competency and Trustworthiness  
This table presents the results of examining the relation between Beauty and career outcomes (1stPlace_Ranking and NumYrsTenure) after controlling for the 
perceived competency (Competency) and perceived trustworthiness (Trustworthiness). Column (1), (2) and (3) report the OLS regression results of 
1stPlace_Ranking on Beauty. Column (4), (5) and (6) report the OLS regression results of NumYrsTenure on Beauty when tenure is achieved at a professor’s first 
school placement. Column (7), (8) and (9) report the OLS regression results of NumYrsTenure on Beauty when tenure is achieved at a professor’s first school 
placement or second school placement when there is a voluntary early departure from the first school. T-values are reported in parentheses. Variable definitions 
are provided in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
NumYrsTen
ure 
(Businesswe
ek school) 
(7) 
 
(8) 
 
(9) 
  1stPlace_Ra
nking 
1stPlace_Ra
nking 
1stPlace_Ra
nking 
NumYrs 
Tenure 
 
NumYrs 
Tenure 
 
NumYrs 
Tenure 
 
NumYrs 
Tenure 
 
NumYrs 
Tenure 
 
NumYrs 
Tenure 
 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
          
Beauty   -0.316***   0.027**   0.022** 
   (-3.38)   (2.98)   (2.25) 
Competency -0.156*  -0.047 0.002  -0.004 0.001  -0.004 
 (-1.86)  (-0.48) (0.40)  (-0.54) (0.66)  (-0.56) 
Trustworthiness  -0.023 0.132  0.002 0.002  0.004 0.003 
  (-0.24) (1.25)  (0.86) (1.12)  (0.64) (0.94) 
          
Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
No. of Obs 714 714 714 276 276 276 321 321 321 
Adj R-Sq  0.1736 0.1695 0.1850 0.2055 0.2054 0.2063 0.1987 0.1955 0.2009 
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Table 9  
Rigorousness of the Tenure and Promotion Process 
This table reports the OLS regression results of NumYrsTenure on subsamples based on the rigorousness of the tenure 
and promotion process. For internal review rigorousness, universities are less (more) rigorous when their internal 
review rigor score is less than (more than or equal to) 3. For external review rigorousness, universities are less (more) 
rigorous when their external review rigor score is less than (more than or equal to) 3. For promotion rigorousness, 
universities are less (more) rigorous when their internal review rigor score is equal to (not equal to) 1.Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. T-values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A The Association between Beauty and Number of Years to Obtain Tenure when Tenure is Achieved at 
a Professor’s First School Placement: Subsample Analysis 
 Internal Review External Review Promotion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
More 
Rigorous 
Less 
Rigorous 
More 
Rigorous 
Less 
Rigorous 
More 
Rigorous 
Less 
Rigorous 
       
Beauty -0.028* -0.024** -0.007 -0.033*** -0.019 -0.024** 
 (-1.85) (-2.12) (-0.38) (-3.17) (-1.64) (-1.84) 
       
       
No. of Obs 86 190 82 194 126 150 
Adj R-Sq 0.2775 0.1504 0.1961 0.2055 0.293 0.1335 
 
 
Panel B The Association between Beauty and Number of Years to Obtain Tenure when Tenure is Achieved at 
a Professor’s First School Placement or Second School Placement when There is a Voluntary Early 
Departure From The First School: Subsample Analysis  
 Internal Review External Review Promotion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
More 
Rigorous 
Less 
Rigorous 
More 
Rigorous 
Less 
Rigorous 
More 
Rigorous 
Less 
Rigorous 
       
Beauty -0.023 -0.021* -0.003 -0.030*** -0.015 -0.023* 
 (-1.61) (-1.77) (-0.20) (-2.85) (-1.38) (-1.67) 
       
No. of Obs 105 216 99 222 152 169 
Adj R-Sq 0.219 0.1630 0.146 0.210 0.250 0.140 
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Figure 1 
Panel A Number of years to tenure if tenure is achieved at the first school 
 
 
Panel B Number of years to tenure if tenure is achieved at the second or subsequent school 
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Panel C Number of years to full professor from time of obtaining tenure 
 
 
Figure 2  
Direct and indirect effects of Beauty on career outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Path a is the direct effect of Beauty on career outcomes (1stPlace_Ranking or NumYrsTenure). 
Path b is the direct effect of Beauty on performance metric measures (Flyout_PhD, Coauthor_Asst, 
Presentation_Asst, and Citation_Asst). 
Path c is the direct effect of performance metric measures  (Flyout_PhD, Coauthor_Asst, 
Presentation_Asst, and Citation_Asst)  on career outcomes (1stPlace_Ranking or NumYrsTenure). 
Path b × Path c is the indirect effect of Beauty on career outcomes (1stPlace_Ranking or 
NumYrsTenure) via performance metric measures (Flyout_PhD, Coauthor_Asst, Presentation_Asst, 
and Citation_Asst). 
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Figure 3  
 
Figure 4 
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